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Abstract  
 
This paper is intended to model the default probabilities for selected Iberian 
Financial Institutions through the application of Merton’s Model (1973) framework. 
Through the use of three different Default Barrier (db) definitions, we were able to 
obtain very different outputs, stressing how crucial db definition is to the structural 
model output. 
Throughout this crisis, liquidity risk was, in some dimension, offset by the ECB 
funding policies. db1 and db2 definitions, differing only on the way Central Bank loans 
were treated, were convenient to test non-standard applications of the model. In our 
study we introduce and test a procedure anchored on Distance to Distress calculation, 
to quantify the reduction in risk induced by ECB measures, finding that ECB actions 
effectively reduced bank’s default risk. 
 
 
Neste estudo procurámos, no âmbito do Modelo de Merton (1973), determinar 
a Distância ao Incumprimento (DD) para uma amostra de bancos Ibéricos. Através da 
especificação de três diferentes Barreiras de Imcumprimento (DB), foi possivel obter 
diferentes resultados, sublinhando a importância da DB para output do modelo.  
Durante a crise, o risco de liquidez foi atenuado pelas políticas de cedência de 
liquidez levadas a cabo pelo BCE. As definições usadas para db1 e db2, diferem na 
forma como são tratados os emprestimos do BCE, permitindo implementar um 
procedimento assente no cálculo da DD para quantificar a redução no risco dos 
bancos induzida por estas medidas. Os nossos resultados demonstram que as 
políticas do BCE reduziram o risco de incumprimento dos bancos que constituem a 
amostra. 
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Chapter I - Introduction 
 
Throughout the last decades, with the improvements of Information 
Technologies, financial markets became increasingly global, leading to a spread 
of risk across a broader spectrum. In such a global environment, the bursting of 
the United States (US) housing bubble and the subsequent plummet of US real 
estate prices triggered a domino effect in financial institutions worldwide, 
leading to the bailout of several banks by national governments. Confidence in 
the solvency of the financial system weakened, causing a liquidity crisis and a 
global downturn in the stock markets. As a result, economies worldwide 
suffered a downturn. 
As a result of the complex interplay between the credit boom and the 
financial innovation, issuance of financial agreements dependent/linked to 
mortgage or credit payments - such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO) - expanded in the years prior to the 2007-
08 Financial Crisis. These complex packages of mortgages and credits were 
sold globally, enabling investors worldwide to be exposed to U.S. housing 
market. 
In this context, financial institutions became highly leveraged, most of 
them through off-balance sheet instruments (securitization or derivatives). 
Lehman Brothers (liquidated), Bear Sterns and Merryl Lynch (sold), Morgan 
Stanley and Goldman Sachs (converted in commercial banks, therefore under 
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tighter regulation), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac1 held USD 9.000bn in debt or 
guarantee obligations (aprox. 65% of US GDP) at the time of the crisis. The 
total asset value of the entire US banking system was of about 
USD10.000bn[24]. 
In Europe, one of the first signs of a financial crisis appeared in August of 
2007 by BNP Paribas, when the redemptions from three hedge funds invested 
in subprime mortgage debt were blocked, due to a liquidity squeeze. Later on, 
Northern Rock, a medium-sized British bank, requested protection from the 
Bank of England, leading to a bank run in mid-September 2007. In February 
2008 Northern Rock was nationalized. From September 2008 throughout 2009 
several other banks collapsed.  
The turmoil originated by the 2007-08 financial crisis evolved into a 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe when, in 2009, the newly elected Greek 
government exposed that previous governments had masked the real Budget 
deficits. Greek debt was already over 120% of GDP and disseminated 
throughout European Bank’s balance sheets. Unable to borrow from the 
financial markets, Greece was bailed out in April of 2010 with a first EUR 110 
bn direct loan by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (EU-
IMF). The crisis spread to Ireland and Portugal2 and placed Italy and Spain 
under pressure from the financial markets. The spread of sovereign debt in the 
                                                            
1 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are US Government sponsored enterprises. 
2 The crisis had different natures: i) in Ireland it was related with the failure of relevant size Banks; ii) in Portugal the 
crisis was related with the public deficit and the stock of public debt.  
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European banks balance sheet arouse concerns regarding the risk exposure of 
the European banking system.  
After a series of downgrades to Portuguese sovereign credit rating and 
an increasing pressure on Portuguese debt in the financial markets, Portugal 
requested, in April 2011, a EUR78bn EU/IMF/ECB bailout package in order to 
stabilise its public finances. This package, Financial Assistance Programme 
(FAP), included Eur 12bn to be used exclusively in recapitalization of the 
banking system.  
Liquidity and stability of the banking system was a concern in FAP 
agreement and priority was given to strengthening Core Tier 1 ratio, raising it to 
9% and 10%, in 2011 and 2012 respectively (above the Basel II agreements 
requirements). Deleveraging of the banks was also pointed as a major target in 
the agreement. Later on, this target was set to a transformation ratio of 120% 
until 2014 and to the creation of temporary core capital buffer to cope with the 
exposure to sovereign debt. The results of the stress tests carried out by 
European Banking Authority (EBA) on 71 European banks, estimated the need 
for a capital buffer of EUR 3,72 bn to the 4 Portuguese banks (BCP, BES, BPI 
and BANIF).  
Under this scenario, the aggregated assets of Portuguese banks 
decreased, anchored on a reduction of stock of credit to clients, returned to 
levels of 2009. Clients’ deposits revealed a favourable behaviour which, in 
conjunction with the effect of the reduction of the stock of credit, led to a 
reduction of the transformation ratio from 156.8% in 2009 to 127,6% in 2012[21]. 
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By the end of 2012, Portuguese banking system had reached a core Tier 
1 capital ratio of 11,7% and a solvency ratio of 12,9%[21], as result of a 
demanding effort of recapitalisation partly supported by the private sector 
through capital increases of approx. EUR 2bn. However, the bulk of the 
recapitalisation of EUR 7,25 bn was done with resource to FAP EUR 12 bn 
euros recapitalization line, through the issuance of hybrid instruments that 
qualify as core tier 1 capital (Coco bonds). These instruments were fully 
subscribed by the Portuguese government. 
Although Spain had a relative low debt level when compared with other 
stressed countries, the bursting of the housing bubble increased pressure in the 
already leveraged Spanish banking system. Caja de Ahorros Castilla La 
Mancha was bailed out in 2009. In 2010 CajaSur followed and Bankia was 
created by merging 7 cajas de ahorros (savings banks); their toxic assets were 
transferred to Banco Financiero y de Ahorros (BFA)3. BFA was set up with a 
capital of EUR 4,5 bn from the Spanish government rescue fund. In July 2011 
55% of Bankia was admitted to Bolsa de Madrid, following an initial public 
offering, and in May 2012, less than a year from the IPO, Bankia received a 
new EUR 19 bn bailout. The bank recognized that the stock of toxic assets 
related to real estate investments figured in between EUR 31,8 bn to EUR 40 
bn and the board requested an injection of EUR 19 bn. Bankia was seized and 
restated its 2011 results, from a reported profit of EUR 309 mn to a loss of 
almost EUR 3 bn. Criminal complaints were filed against Bankia’s management. 
                                                            
3 In 2010, Banco Financiero y de Ahorros (BFA) was controlled by Caja Madrid, Bancaja, La Caja de Canarias, Caja de 
Ávila, Caixa Laietana, Caja Segovia and Caja Rioja, and owned Bankia.  
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This event led to a request of financial assistance to the Spanish banking 
system. The Eurogroup granted a financial support package of a maximum of 
EUR100 bn, transferred to a government-owned Spanish fund responsible to 
conduct the required bank recapitalisations - Fondo de Reestructuración 
Ordenada Bancaria (FROB). 
An external assessment was performed on the Spanish Banking System 
and from its conclusions a recapitalization plan was drawn. Banks were 
classified into 4 groups, accordingly to their capital needs: 
• Group 0, where no capital needs were found, and therefore no 
recapitalisation measures needed to be undertaken, comprised Santander, 
BBVA, CaixaBank, Banco Sabadell, Kutxabank, Unicaja and Bankinter.  
• Group 1 includes the nationalized Banks that were partially or fully in 
the possession of FROB  
• Group 2 comprises Banks with capital needs, that couldn’t obtain the 
necessary funds from private initiative, therefore needing government 
assistance  
• Group 3 is composed by Banks with capital needs that resorted to 
private initiative to attain the necessary funds.  
Finally an instrument was created, Sociedad de Gestión de Activos 
procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria (Sareb), owned in 45% by FROB 
and 55% by private equity, in order to absorb the toxic assets from the 4 
nationalized Banks (BFA - Bankia, Catalunya Banc, NCG Banco - Banco 
Gallego and Banco de Valencia) or those undertaking a restructuring or 
liquidation process (Banco Mare Nostrum, CEISS, Caja3 y Liberbank).  
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Overall public funds used to recapitalize the Spanish banking system 
reached EUR 61,495 bn, of which EUR 7,942 bn obtained through the deposits 
warranty fund, coupled up with EUR 14,475 bn granted by the FROB. An 
additional amount of EUR 1,135 bn comprised hybrid instruments that qualified 
as core tier 1 capital subscribed by the FROB. In direct capital injections from 
the government in banks, the figure reached approximately EUR 38 bn[27]. 
This crisis affected the image of the banking system and the confidence 
between peers. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2007 the international debt 
markets environment has been tighter, in particular for banks from stressed 
countries, increasing concerns on liquidity risk and the stability of the banking 
system as whole.  
The European Central Bank played a crucial role in granting liquidity to 
the financial system, avoiding the undesirable consequences of an abrupt 
deleveraging which could lead to a downward deflationary spiral. Besides the 
Eurosystem’s standard open market liquidity-providing operations in euro, 
shorter term main refinancing operations (MROs) and long-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs), the ECB launched several non-standard initiatives:  
• two liquidity-providing long-term refinancing operations in euro with a 
three-year maturity (maturing on January and February 2015): 
• launched two covered bond purchase programmes: CBPP, which 
ended in June 2010, and CBPP2, which ended in October 2012; 
• interventions in debt markets under the Securities Markets Programme 
(SMP) conducted between May 2010 and February 2012;  
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• Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), announced in August 2012, 
comprised interventions in government bonds with a remaining maturity of up to 
three years.  
• In June 2014, ECB announced a series of targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations (TLTROs), during 2 years, to stimulate bank lending to 
the euro area non-financial private sector. This measure excludes loans to 
households for house purchase. 
In this context, credit risk, already a fundamental concern within Basel II 
framework, has become a greater concern. Under Basel II and III, bank’s 
economic capital requirements as a function of the risk of the credit portfolio 
became more demanding. This macro prudential requirement had two major 
effects for financial institutions: i) Increased operational costs to assess their 
credit risk exposures, either in processes, IT applications or in expertise; ii) 
Strong investments from Financial Institution’s shareholders to fulfil the 
minimum capital requirements.  
Credit risk modelling, taking into account the relationship between 
intrinsic characteristics of a borrower and its ability to fulfil its responsibilities, 
has become more and more popular. Founded by Merton’s model (1974), 
structural models for credit risk approaches the value of the firm as claims from 
two different players: shareholders and debt holders. Shareholders have a 
positive payoff when the face value of firm’s assets is superior to its liabilities. 
Consequently, in this case, the creditors can be reimbursed. 
Whenever a firm’s assets value is lower than the value of liabilities, a 
default event occurs and shareholders, who have limited responsibility, have a 
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zero payoff. Shareholders claim is perceived as a call option on the firm’s 
assets value. Credit risk and default probabilities are, therefore, explained with 
resource to balance sheet risk. The uncertainty of future value of assets, 
comparatively to the due payments on debt, is the driver of default risk.  
This methodology results from the application of option theory and is also 
known in literature as Contingent Claim Analysis (CCA). A contingent claim is 
defined as a financial asset whose future payoff depends on the value of 
another asset, and therefore an option is a typical example of a contingent 
claim.  
Banks transform liquid liabilities (deposits) into illiquid claims (loans, 
mortgages, car loans, etc), providing a crucial service to the economy. This 
intermediation role of banks is provided because maturities of liabilities and 
assets are mismatched. This maturity transformation, allowing inter-temporal 
optimizations of consumption or investment decisions, leave the banks exposed 
to liquidity risks, in the worst scenario bank runs[3]. In fact, even the 
determination of the amount of debt due in a given moment comes with a few 
if’s. Long term deposits, for instance, in a first approach could be classified as 
long term debt. However, if the depositor accepts the loss of the accrued 
interest, long term deposits can be withdrawn at any moment, becoming short 
term liabilities. In a crisis context, where lack of confidence may cause bank 
runs, this must be taken into account. On the other hand, short-term deposits 
can be renewed, showing more stable behaviour. 
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Assessing the credit risk of financial institutions is challenging, due to the 
difficulty in evaluating the quality of their assets and the extent of their liabilities. 
As already seen, in 2007 seven US financial institutions held 65% of US GDP in 
debt, without the necessary financial cushion to face losses or defaults. 
Structural models assume that equity markets know and value these 
uncertainties. Therefore, equity markets prices discount these risks.  
Given its fundamental economic role and the possible relevant fiscal 
and/or social cost of a bank failure, most financial institutions, are regulated 
and, in face of possible distress, the regulator tend to act to avoid a default. In 
fact, very few financial institutions actually default, and therefore the calibration 
and testing of the model is changeling. 
The use of models involves costs and risk. Not only the direct resource 
risks to develop and implement the model, but more importantly the risk of 
trusting an incorrect and misused model that could lead to losses. While 
implementing a model simplifications, approximations, or incorrect assumptions 
are taken, that may lead to incorrect outputs (Model Error). Even if the Model is 
properly implemented, it may be applied outside its application range. Thus 
Model Risk may be defined as the potential for adverse consequences based 
on incorrect or misused model output. 
Model Risk has captured the attention of regulators and institutions, n 
order to develop model validation practices and to establish a comprehensive 
framework of proactive Model Risk management. 
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Therefore our proposal is to estimate the Distance to Default for a 
selected sample of Iberian Banks, using three definitions of Default’s Barrier. 
We also intend to test a procedure to quantify the reduction in bank’s risk 
induced by ECB’s funding policy. 
Chapter II- Contingent Claim Analysis Overview 
 
Contingent Claim analysis framework was first presented by Merton in its 
paper “On the pricing of Corporate Debt: the Risk Structure of Interest Rates” 
(1974). For the first time, newly presented option pricing theory was applied to 
the capital structure of a non-financial companies, banks or non-bank financial 
institutions, allowing the assessment of default probability through market price 
of the company’s equity and debt value. The asset of a bank financed by equity 
and debt, in Merton’s Model approach modelled as zero coupon bonds, is 
therefore a sum of the market value of equity and the value of risky debt.  
Under this framework, the holders of equity have a contingent claim on 
the residual value of assets in the future, and are entitled to a positive payoff if 
the asset value is above the liabilities level. Due to equity holders’ limited 
responsibility, they have a zero payoff in case of default.  
In this situation, debt holders have a right to take over the remaining 
assets and sell them, a far from desirable scenario. Under these circumstances 
debt holders may have to absorb losses. Therefore uncertainty in future asset 
value, when promised payments on debt are concerned, is the driver of default 
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risk. This uncertainty in asset value is represented by a probability distribution at 
time horizon T.  
Although the asset value is not observable in the market, its equity price 
is available and, with resource to Merton’s options theory, it is possible to obtain 
the asset value, if the default point is known. Equity volatility can be written as 
function of leverage ratio, the hedge ratio obtained through the option theoretic 
approach and finally the asset value. Therefore, asset’s market value and its 
volatility are derived from the equity value, equity volatility and liabilities by 
solving the call price and volatility equations.  
Black & Cox (1976) relaxed the maturity assumption allowing the 
company to default at any moment, not only at maturity. In this model default 
occurs whenever payments are due to creditors, at discrete moments in time. 
This added some realism to the model but keeps the advantage of easy 
implementation as a closed form model. Furthermore they refer to the possible 
existence of an upper and lower boundary of the asset value, introducing for the 
first time the concept of default barrier as the lower boundary for asset value, 
below which default may happen.  
A successful example of empirical use of the Merton Model is MKMV4 
methodology to predict the default probabilities of individual firms. In their tests 
MKMV found that probabilities from Merton’s model tend to be unrealistic. 
MKMV considers that option-pricing relationship as characterized by Merton’s 
approach with just two classes of liabilities (equity and a zero coupon bond), is 
                                                            
4 KMV Corporation was acquired by Moodys in 2002, their model is proprietary. Crosbie & Bhon (2003) provided a 
simplified version to MKMV model that became widely used by the academic literature.  
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too simplistic. Instead, they propose the incorporation of five liability classes: 
short-term, long-term, convertible, preferred equity, and common equity. 
MKMV considers the relationship between asset value and default 
barrier, critical to the accurate determination of default probability. In presence 
of adverse changes, either in asset value or leverage ratio, the default 
probability may not be accurate. As the leverage ratio isn’t static, registering 
frequent changes, they consider that the model linking equity and asset volatility 
holds only instantaneously, therefore not providing reliable outputs. In their 
testing, MKMV found that the model biases default probabilities, given that for 
fast decreases in leverage the model tends to overestimate the asset volatility, 
conducting to higher default probability, when credit risk is actually decreasing. 
The reverse, for fast increases in leverage, also verifies.  
To obtain asset market value and volatility, MKMV relies on the option 
nature of equity but with a twist, as they solve backwards from the option price 
and option price volatility to the implied asset value and asset volatility through 
an interactive process. The procedure generates an initial guess for asset value 
volatility used to determine an estimate of asset value and generate a series of 
asset returns. Next, with the set of asset returns, a new set of asset volatility is 
obtained and used to reinitiate the next iteration for a new set of asset values. 
The procedure is repeated until it converges. 
Finally, distance-to-default (DD) is calculated as the number of standard 
deviations the asset’s market value is from default barrier. This DD is then 
compared with a frequency table that matches DD with the probability of default.  
MKMV frequency table was generated with resource to an empirical database 
Daniela Azeredo           Structural Models to Estimate Financial Institution’s Default Probability 15 
 
 15     
of defaults and bankruptcies including data of more than 250,000 company-
years and about 4,700 defaults or bankruptcies events [8].  
MKMV tested their frequency table for several variables such as industry, 
size or time, finding that the relation between DD and default frequency is 
constant, and differences across the considered variables seem to be captured 
in DD measure [8].  
Another interesting extension was introduced by Geske (1977), who 
values debt and equity as compound options. Opposite to the restrictive zero 
coupon bond assumption of Merton Model, this model considers the fact that 
companies usually have more complex debt structures, usually involving 
coupon payments in different maturities.  
Thereby Geske (1977) claimed that, in presence of multiple cash-flows, 
equity should be perceived as a compound option on the assets, where each 
cash flow represented a strike price for the compound option. The idea behind 
this formulation is that shareholders, whenever a payment is due, have the 
option to default. If the asset value is sufficient, implying a positive equity value, 
shareholders may issue equity at current prices to cope with the payment to 
creditors. If the asset value falls, the equity value will also fall making it more 
challenging to issue new equity to fulfil obligation to creditors. Under these 
circumstances, shareholders may choose not to exercise the compound call 
option, therefore defaulting on the due payments. Thereby, creditors assume 
control of the assets according to their priority. Under this mechanism, default is 
determined as the asset value that sets the value of equity equal to the next 
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cash flow; asset value falling below this level means that equity value is 
negative. Default in this method is endogenous to the model. 
According to this dynamics, new equity is issued for each payment to 
creditors, therefore reducing debt and increasing equity systematically. This 
implies a continuous deleveraging over time, and stands for the most criticisable 
assumption of the compound option structural model, since a systematic 
reduction of leverage is not realistic. 
Also with an endogenous default barrier, but with a slightly different 
formulation, Leland (1994) developed a structural credit risk model that includes 
most of Black & Cox (1976) assumptions, but assumes the existence of one 
class of debt with infinite maturity and a fixed coupon. The default barrier is 
endogenous and determined as the lowest possible asset value that allows 
positive equity values.  
Through the inclusion of parameters as taxes or bankruptcy costs, 
Leland incorporated features of capital structure decisions in a credit risk model, 
mainly treated as exogenous in structural credit risk models. Leland (1994) 
model provides close form solutions for debt and equity values, the default 
barrier and the optimal capital structure. Two years later Leland & Toft (1996) 
presented an extension to take debt maturity into account. 
Longstaff & Schwartz (1995) extended Black & Cox (1976) to incorporate 
stochastic interest rates, using Vasicek’s mean-reverting term structure 
dynamics. The default barrier is exogenous and constant for the life of the bank, 
just by assuming that every coupon or principal payment is financed with new 
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debt issuances. The default process, described as first passage phenomena, 
has an innovative aspect; it assumes that, when the asset value of the company 
crosses the default barrier, debt holders may receive a percentage of the face 
value of the debt (recovery rate) and have to write-off the remaining. In other 
words, at default a corporate bond is exchanged for an equivalent default-free 
bond at a write-off rate, dependent on the priority and maturity of the issue. 
Thus authors point out that, for different categories of debt, different recovery 
rates may be found. Under these conditions, the value of a fixed-rate bond, with 
a given interest rate and default probability, is a function of the measure of 
distance to the default barrier (Asset Value (V)/ Default Barrier (K)), of the 
stochastic interest rate and the time to maturity. 
Through empirical analysis, Longstaff & Schwartz (1995) found that 
credit spreads are negatively correlated with interest rates and equity returns, 
although the significance of the parameters differs across credit ratings or 
industries. 
Later, Briys & Varenne (1997) presented an extension of Black & Cox 
(1976) model, introducing a stochastic default-free interest rate in the default 
barrier expression and the default write-down treatment of Longstaff & Schwartz 
(1995).  
In general, a transversal characteristic of the previous models is a 
constant capital structure, which does not reflect reality. In fact, empirical 
studies suggest that companies do not maintain constant their capital 
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structures, issuing or repurchasing debt, according to increases or falls in 
company’s value. (Hsu et al (2010)). 
Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001) argue that the constant capital 
structure assumption leads to mispricing of risk premium of debt, as valuation of 
the debt should take into consideration not only the issued debt, but also the 
option to issue more debt. The authors argue that without any constrains on 
future leverage, firms may issue more debt, increasing leverage. This option 
implies changes in the default probability (increasing it), hence debt holders 
tend to reflect this risk increase in the price of current outstanding debt. 
Thereby, the authors propose an extension to Longstaff & Schwartz (1995) to 
cope for changes in leverage, moving the default barrier up and down 
accordingly. These movements in leverage are unpredictable, thus the default 
barrier is modelled as a stochastic process. This model brought some 
theoretical enlightenment on how capital structure changes affect bond prices’ 
mechanism. 
Although theoretically, extensions on Merton Model brought some 
enlightenment on bond pricing and default mechanisms; they also translate into 
more and more mathematical complexity. Does this extra complexity add 
predictability to the model? Several authors, such as Jones et al (1984) or 
Ogden (1987) tested Merton type models in order to validate for their 
predictability, concluding that these models tend to overprice corporate bonds. 
Jones, Mason & Rosenfeld (1983) used bond prices between 1977 and 1981, 
finding that prices obtained from Merton model overestimate in 452bp bond 
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prices. Ogden (1987) found that yield spread is under-predicted by an average 
of 104 bp if Merton model is used.  
Eom, Helwege & Huang (2004) tested five structural models - Merton 
(1974), Geske (1977), Longstaff & Schwartz (1995), Leland & Toft (1996), and 
Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001) - finding better predictability of yield spreads 
on Longstaff & Schwartz, Leland & Toft, and Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein 
models, due to the inclusion of stochastic default-free rates. Nonetheless the 
error is large and error distribution show fat tails, thus extremely large or small 
spreads are common. Their conclusions also indicate that the five models don’t 
behave well in pricing bond issues for companies with low leverage or 
volatilities.  
Several tests on the financial system have been performed in the last 
decade. Gropp et al (2005) empirically tested the efficiency of DD and the 
subordinated bond spreads to anticipate the default risk of 100 European 
banks. Both indicators showed some predictive ability: i) DD revealed to be a 
useful mechanism for forecasting potential distress up to 18 months before the 
crisis, but poor predictive ability close to default; ii) subordinated debt-based 
signals showed good predictive power for smaller banks. They also found that 
the use of both indicators together granted more predictive power than each 
indicator on its own.  
Later on, Harada, Ito & Takahashi (2010) examined DD patterns of eight 
failed Japanese banks in order to evaluate its predictive power for bank failures, 
showing that DD signalled the failure in many cases. The authors presented a 
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DD spread, defined as the difference of DD of a failed bank and the DD of 
sound banks, a measure that revealed to be useful to indicate the deterioration 
of a bank’s health. However, for some banks in the sample, neither the DD nor 
the DD spread were able to signal the failures, a fact that the authors attributed 
to lack of transparency in financial statements and disclosed information. 
 
Chapter III- The Merton Model               
Companies are financed with debt (D) and equity (E).  
The total market value of assets (A) at any given time (t) of a company is 
equal to the market value of equity plus market value of risky debt maturing at 
time T.  
( ) )()( tDtEtA +=              (1) 
Asset value is stochastic and is assumed to follow a standard geometric 
Brownian motion. Asset value may decline below the point where scheduled 
debt payments can be made, also known as Default Barrier (DB). In this case 
the equity holders, due to their limited responsibility, have a zero payoff. 
Therefore the value of equity can be expressed as an option, where equity 
holders receive the maximum of either assets minus debt, or nothing in the case 
of default (E = max [ A – DB, 0]). 
If a default event occurs, debt holders are entitled to take over the 
remaining assets of the company and sell them; this fact can be regarded as a 
guarantee. Thus, risky debt holders’ payoff is either the default free value or, in 
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case of default, a claim on assets. The guarantee can be seen as an implicit put 
option (P) on assets yielding max[DB – A, 0], and can be read as the expected 
loss if default occurs. Default-free debt equals to the sum of value of risky debt 
and value of the guarantee. As the value of default-free debt is the distress 
barrier, risky debt at moment t is given by: 
D(t)= DBe )(Tr− -P(t),                                   (2)  
where T represents time to maturity and r the risk free interest rate.  
As seen, assets and liabilities in the company’s balance sheet can be 
related using implicit options, thus priced through the standard option pricing 
formula (Black-Scholes). The value of an option can be derived by forming a 
riskless hedge portfolio, constructed with resource to a position in a derivative 
security and a position in a stock, both exposed to the same source of 
uncertainty. In this scenario, if suitable positions are established, movements on 
the stock position will offset the movements from the derivative security and, at 
the end of the period, the overall value of the portfolio is known. The return of 
such portfolio is the risk free rate of interest.  
The value of equity as a call option on company’s assets at moment t is,
( ) ( ) ( )21 dNDBedANtE rT−−=          (3) 
where A is the value of the assets, E is the value of equity, DB is the default 
barrier, r is the risk-free rate of interest, T is the time to maturity on the default 
free bond in years. N(d) is the cumulative probability distribution function for a 
standard normal variable, and d1and d 2  can be written as,  
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where Aσ  is the standard deviation of return on firm assets.  
Although the company’s asset value and volatility are not observable in 






=            (5) 
where Eσ  is the standard deviation of equity.  
Through the above formulation the standard deviation of equity can be 
derived from historical data and used to solve for asset volatility. 
From this formulation two important measures arise: distance to distress 
and probability of default. DD computes the difference between the implied 
market value of company’s assets and the distress barrier scaled by a one 
standard deviation move in those assets. It yields the number of standard 












= ,          (6) 
where Aµ is the expected return on assets.  
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This metric can later be translated into the probability of default simply by 
replacing in the normal cumulative density distribution 
 
[ ] ( ) ( )DDNDDNDBAP −=−=≤ 1 ,         (7) 
Keeping everything else constant, if asset value grows, company’s 
leverage decreases and the probability of default lowers. In this scenario the 
price on the implicit put option from the guarantee lowers, as bondholders have 
a lower expectation of losses. If assets become very large, price on the implicit 
put option from the guarantee tends to zero. Therefore if asset value 
continuously grows, the risky debt value tends to the value of default-free debt 
(as the implicit put option tends to zero). 
On the other hand if the company’s assets continuously decline, 
probability that the company will not service its debt increases, implying a 
continuous increase in the price of the implicit put option from the guarantee 
and a continuous decrease in equity value. 
If the asset’s value volatility increases, the probability that assets value 
fall below the distress barrier increases and the price of the implicit put option 
from the guarantee increases. Company’s assets will be closer to the default 
barrier, making a default event more probable, thus equity less valuable. 
Conversely, if volatility of company’s assets approaches zero, DD increases 
and a default event is less probable. Equity value will increase and price of the 
implicit put option from the guarantee will decrease. 
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Chapter IV – Distance to Default in Iberian banking system  
 
In our study we computed weekly DD for a sample of 8 Iberian Banks, 
within Merton Model framework, following the methodologies found in Crosbie & 
Bohn (2003) and Imerman (2012). The method applied may be summarized in 3 
steps: i) Calculus of DB, ii) Determination of Asset Value Market and iii) 
Calculus of DD. All our calculations were made using Microsoft Excel.  
To obtain DD it’s crucial to determine the Bank’s market asset value and 
its respective volatility (Step 2). We will determine market asset value with 
resource to an iterative process. To initiate the procedure we use a first 
estimate for the asset value, obtained by adding the book value of liabilities to 
the market value of equity (outstanding shares times share price). With this first 
estimate a set of asset returns and volatilities5 is generated. This first estimate 
of volatility is later used in the option pricing model (equation [3] from previous 
chapter) to generate a second set of asset values. The second set of asset 
values is then used to obtain a new set of asset volatilities (equation [5] from 
previous chapter). Volatilities obtained will be used in equation [3] to generate 
the final set of Asset Values. For equation [5] of the previous chapter we, 
additionally, computed equity volatility (1 year historical standard deviation). 
Finally, for solving equation [3] we resorted to the use of Eurozone Yield Curve 
1 year rate.  
                                                            
5 The first estimate of Volatility is calculated trough excel function of standard deviation.  
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The third and final step in our study is DD calculation, defined as the 
difference between the market value of bank’s assets (step 2) and the default 
barrier (step 1) scaled by a one standard deviation move in bank’s assets 
(equation (6) from previous chapter). DD may be computed with resource to the 
risk-free rate or to asset’s market value rate of return. According to Harada, Ito 
& Takahashi (2010), use of the return on asset’s market value is more suitable 
to the determination of DD, as assets are managed at a floating interest rate 
and not at a risk free rate. In our computation of DD we follow Harada, Ito & 
Takahashi (2010) and used the rate of return on assets from the previous 12 
months as an estimate for the expected return rate.  
The scope of our analysis goes from 2006 to 2013, a range of 8 years, 
marked by different flows of news and events. Although we computed weekly 
DD, for the sake of result presentation, we will classify the time interval into 4 
time intervals:  
i) The years of 2006 and 2007, prior to the epicentre of the financial 
crisis, marked by a low perception of risk.  
ii) The period between 2008 and 2010, characterized by an acute 
liquidity shortfall with a mild response from the ECB.  
iii) The period between 2011 and 2012, when Portugal and Spain 
endured a demanding recapitalization process of the banking system. ECB 
reinforced its open market liquidity-providing operations and its newly 
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designated president, Mario Draghi, made very clear that ECB "...is ready to do 
whatever it takes to preserve the Euro. And believe me, it will be enough." 6.  
iv) The year of 2013, characterized by some stability, a mild growth in 
client’s deposits and a small reduction of ECB loans on total assets.  
Balance sheet data for DB calculation was obtained from the Portuguese 
and Spanish banking associations, APB and AEB, respectively. For more 
detailed information regarding the liabilities we resorted to the bank’s balance 
sheet information and its respective notes. Deposits were classified according 
to their nature (clients, financial institutions and central bank) and their maturity 
(less than 1 year, from 1 to 5 years, more than 5 years). We assumed that 
clients’ and financial institutions’ deposits with more than 5 years of maturity 
signalled a relation of great trust and therefore depositors are not going redeem 
their deposits before maturity. Bonds were classified according to maturity.  
The remaining data used in our calculations was obtained in Datastream 
and Bloomberg. 
Wholesale funding market suffered with the lack of confidence between 
peers, leading to a reduction of financial institutions deposits of -4,5% in 2011-
12. This reduction was compensated by an increase of 46.2% in Central Bank 
deposits for the same period. During this period clients’ deposits increased in 
0.5%, revealing a very stable behaviour (more information in Appendix A). In 
face of the particular conditions financial institutions endured and the role 
                                                            
6 Mario Draghi’s intervention in Global Investment Conference, July 26, 2012, available at 
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=hMBI50FXDps,. (Retrieved 2014-07-17) 
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played by ECB in granting liquidity to the financial system, we decided to use in 
our calculations, three different definitions for the DB, imposing some 
hypothesis: 
•  Default Barrier 1 (db1) - highlights the role of ECB as lender of last 
resort and follows Crouhy, Galai & Mark (2000) db definition: short Term + ½ 
long term liabilities. We assumed that all loans from the central bank are 
indefinitely renewable (not to be paid back) therefore not considered in the 
composition of the db1. Clients’ and Financial Institutions deposits are 
considered as: i) short term if maturities up to 1 year, ii) long term if maturities 
from 1 to 5 years, therefore ½ is considered for DB calculus, iii) maturities of 
more than 5 years follow our assumption that the depositor is not performing an 
early redemption. All other items are classified according to their maturity. 
•  Default Barrier 2 (db2) - anchors on the hypothesis that there is no 
lender of last resort, so Central Bank loans have the same behaviour as other 
loans (either Financial Institutions or Households). Central Bank, Clients’ and 
Financial Institutions deposits are considered as: i) short term if maturities up to 
1 year, ii) long term if maturities from 1 to 5 years, and ½ is considered for DB 
calculus, iii) maturities of more than 5 years follow our assumption that the 
depositor is not performing an early redemption. All other items are classified 
according to their maturity. 
•  Default Barrier 3 (db3) - is the most extreme definition of the db used, 
where all deposits are considered as short-term liabilities and all bonds are long 
term, following Harada, Ito & Takahashi (2010) definition of db (more 
information available in Appendix B). 
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With these three different definitions of Default Barrier, we will generate 
three different DD’s, DD1, DD2 and DD3.  
The only difference between db1 and db2 is the way central bank deposits 
are treated. This specification allows a perception of the reduction of risk to 
banks, induced by the central bank liquidity granting actions and a quantification 
of that reduction. To further highlight this effect, we have decided to introduce a 
measure, DD2-DD1, corresponding to the difference between DD2 and DD1 
that expresses the reduction on the number of standard deviations (std dev) 
induced by ECB actions. We choose to use a negative measure in order obtain 
a more immediate reading. 
The banks chosen to integrate the sample are Millenium BCP, BES, BPI 
and Banif (the four listed private Portuguese banks) and Banco Santander, 
Banco Popular, Banco de Valencia and Bankia (to represent the Spanish 
Banking System). Most of these banks had to endure a severe recapitalization 
process, deleverage their assets and rationalize operating costs. The only 
exception is Banco Santander that did not need to reinforce the Core Tier 1 
capital. For more information on the sample, please resort to Appendix D. 
We computed weekly DD for three different definitions of db, finding that 
DD3, calculated with the most extreme default barrier, is in general, the lowest. 
However in the case of BES, this general rule does not apply, due to BES 
particular funding structure up to 2010, very dependent of bonds issuance 
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(Appendix C - figure 6). Approximately 30%7 of the BES assets were funded 
through bonds until the end of 2010, and db3 assumes that all bond issuances 
are long term liabilities, therefore in this particular situation db3 is lower than 
db1 or 2 and consequently is more distant from default (DD3 > DD1> DD2). 
BES DD3 measure averaged 221, 90, 30 and 13,5 std dev for 2006-2007, 
2008-2010, 2011-2012 and 2013 respectively. A continuous change in the 
maturity structure of liabilities, decreasing longer term and increasing shorter 
term maturities, led to this result. In 2006 DB3 represented 65% of total assets 
while in 2013 it represented 77% (bonds issuances represented only 12% of 
total assets vs 73% of deposits). From October 2013 onwards, DD3 reached 
values in the range of 2.34 to 0.43 std dev, signalling distress with 10 months in 
advance to BES’ turmoil, which resulted in the splitting of the bank in a good 
bank (Novo Banco) and a bad bank (BES) (for detailed information please 
resort to Appendix D). The other two measures (DD1 and DD2) showed an 
increase of risk, but were not able to effectively signal distress.  
By the end of 2011, with the launch of long term refinancing operations  
(3 years), BES converts the maturities of its liabilities to the ECB from shorter 
terms to longer terms, and by the end of 2012 only 1,5% of the total amount had 
a maturity inferior to 12 months. This conversion of maturities impacted our 
measures, reducing DD1 to levels closer to DD2. In Appendix C - figure 6 we 
can see an abrupt fall in DD1 and a raise in DD2-DD1 due to this event. These 
loans were due by the end of 2014, becoming short term by end 2013, 
                                                            
7 For he same period BCP funded 10% of its assets with bonds, BPI 18%, BANIF 3%, Banco Santander 9%, Popular 
17% and Banco Valencia 8%.    
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increasing again the gap between DD1 and DD2, by an average of 9 std dev. 
On average, the reduction of risk induced by the Central Bank actions in BES 
(DD2-DD1) was of 9, 13,4 and 12,3 std dev in 2008-2010, 2011-2012 and 2013, 
respectively (detailed data can be found in Appendix C- Table 9). 
DD3 was also able to signal distress in Banif, when DD3 reached 
negative levels in July 2012, after the bank acknowledged EUR711 mn of 
impairments (Appendix C - figure 8). On the 31st of December Banif’s severe 
recapitalization process was announced (for more details please resort to 
Appendix D). We obtained negative readings for DD3 until June 2013 (although 
decreasingly negatives), reaching positive readings on July 2013, after the 
capital increase of EUR450 mn. During the period where DD3 was negative, 
DD1 and DD2, averaged 150,85 and 100,59 std dev. These two measures, 
DD1 and DD2, more sensitive to changes in short term liabilities, reacted to the 
reduction of short term clients’ deposits (-14% when compared with 2011) and 
other financial institutions (-85% Vs 2011), peaking on July 2013 with the capital 
increase. This effect was amplified by the low volatility of Banif’s assets market 
value (averaging 0,22% since October 2011 to July 2013). In July 2013, an 
increase in asset’s volatility from an average of 0,22% to an average of 0,93% 
led to an abrupt fall in DD1 and DD2. 
In 2H2009, we can observe that db1 and db2 start diverging, as the 
wholesale funding market tightens and ECB steps in as the lender of last resort. 
Our DD2-DD1 measure deviates from zero and averages -11,9 std dev in 2008-
2010. The weight of ECB loans on Banif’s total assets keeps growing until 2013, 
from 8% in 2008-2010 to 18% in 2013. Our DD2-DD1 reflects that growth, 
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reaching a peak in July 2013 of a reduction of 136,79 standard deviations std 
dev in Banif’s distance to default. In 2011 semi-annual report Banif 
acknowledged €2,753bn of debt instruments acquired in 2010 under 
securitizations programmes, restating 2010 annual reports. Figure 8 of 
appendix C show an abrupt increase in asset value and in liabilities, 
consequently in all default barriers. We performed an adjustment on the series 
of asset returns, ignoring this jump on the asset value, to avoid the impact of the 
increase of 43% instantaneous return on asset value, and therefore in Appendix 
C - figure 8, we do not have a jump in DD results on July 2011. 
DD3 readings for BPI reached levels close to zero since July 2013, 
averaging 2.12 until the end of the year (Appendix C - figure 7). For the abrupt 
fall, two different effects concur: i) a reduction of €2,3 bn in the credit portfolio 
and ii) the continuous change in the BPI’s funding structure, as weight of bonds 
issued in total assets lowered from 8% in 2012 to 6% in 20138. The effect of 
liabilities growth is also visible in DD1 and DD2, through the period we 
analysed. Specially in 2H2013, when we can observe an abrupt fall, with 
DD1and DD2 averaging 48,57 and 35,99. These results for DD1 and DD2 are 
significantly away from default due to a significant reduction of the percentage 
of assets funded by short term liabilities (from 51% in the end of 2012, to 45% in 
2013)9, as clients deposits maturing in 1 to 5 years grew 125% from EUR 1,8bn 
to EUR 4 bn, resulting in a conversion of deposits from shorter to longer 
                                                            
8 Author’s calculations with resort to the bank’s balance sheet. In 2006 the percentage of bonds issued in total assets 
was 20%. db3 regards all bonds issued as long term, therefore, keeping everything else constant, when the weight 
bonds issuance in the funding structure of the lowers, db3 increases and DD3 decreases.  
 
9 Author’s calculations with resort to the bank’s balance sheet.  
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maturities. Also in 2H2009, db1 and db2 started diverging and our DD2-DD1 
measure deviates from zero, averaging -9 std dev for 2008-10 (Appendix C - 
figure 7). By the end of 2010, DD2-DD1 reaches a peak of -29,90 std dev, the 
maximum reduction in risk obtained from ECB’s actions. With the beginning of 
the longer term refinancing operations (3 years), BPI converts short term loans 
into longer term and increases the amount of long term loans obtained from 
ECB (80% of ECB loans are long term). The difference between db1 and db2 
lowers, with the respective increase in DD2-DD1. 
In April 2008, BCP completed a capital increase of EUR 1,3 bn 
(Appendix C - figure 5), originating a jump in Asset Market Value. As a result, all 
DD measures increase. We can observe this movement until the end of 2009, 
when the weight of bond issued on total assets drops from 16% in mid 2009 to 
14% by the end of the year, reaching 12% in the mid 201010. DD3 falls from 
62,62 to 48,56 std dev. Additionally, as the roll-over of maturing bonds issues 
became more difficult, the maturities profile of debt issued changes, as longer 
terms weight drop from 85% to 75%. DD1 and DD2 register an abrupt fall, from 
109,12 to 75,62 and from 105,23 to 67,55 std dev respectively.  
The ECB covered bond purchase program in conjunction with the 
tightening of international markets for the Portuguese Government (as already 
seen in BPI), motivated the growth of BCP’s debt portfolio to EUR 6,7 bn (vs 
EUR 2,02 bn in 2009), of which 43% was due to the acquisition of Portuguese 
Sovereign Debt. The weight of ECB loans on BCP’s assets grew from an 
                                                            
10 Greece was bailed out in April 2010. From then onwards Portuguese Sovereign Debt suffered several credit rating 
downgrades, impacting the country’s credit spread, and banks credit spread as a consequence.  
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average of 2% until mid 2009, to a maximum of 16% in 2010, with the 
consequent reduction of db1. DD2-DD1 reflects that movement reaching a peak 
of -134.19 std dev in the end of 2011. In 2H2012 ECB loans to BCP are 
converted to long term, therefore db1 converges to db2 (the difference between 
the two is ½ of ECB’s loans) and DD2-DD1 becomes closer to zero (averages -
23 std dev, until the of 2013). During this period, the 2011 capital increases of 
EUR 260 mn originates a growth in all DD measures, effect that was amplified 
by a decrease of BCP asset volatility from an average of 0,67% (2006 to June 
2011) to an average of 0,25% (July 2011 to September 2012). DD1, in 
particular, reaches a peak at 307,17 std dev away from default, due to the ECB 
funding programmes (db1 considers that ECB loans are indefinitely renewable). 
Finally, in October 2012, BCP completed a capital increase of EUR500 mn. The 
impact of the capital increase in DD’s measures was offset by the growth of 
asset’s volatility (average of 0,25% to 0,5% from September 2012 until the end 
of 2013). 
Santander bank was included in the sample because it is a 
systematically important financial institution. In July 2007, db3 starts to diverge 
from db1 and 2 (Appendix C - figure 1), as the weight of bonds issues drop in 
Santander’s funding structure, from 10% in December 2006 to 9% in July 2007. 
DD3, which until July 2007 differed from the other measures on average 3 
standard deviations, increased that difference to an average of 11 standard 
deviations. In the first months of 2008, a reduction of 22% in other Financial 
Institutions loans in conjunction with a drop of 6% in clients’ deposits, affect 
funding structure, with corporate bond regaining importance (15%). DD3 
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increases to 52,37 from 47,62 std dev. DD1 and DD2 register fall in this period, 
due to the reduction of deposits. In 2013, Santander absorbs Banco Banesto, 
member of Santander Group since 1994. In figure 1 we can observe a jump in 
asset value and liabilities due to this incorporation, with a respective increase in 
all DD measures. The impact of the ECB’s funding policies is practically 
unperceived in Santander, as the maximum risk reduction is 8,39 std dev on 
July 2012.  
In Banco Popular we can observe movements in the dbs similar to the 
ones registered in Banco Santander, converging or diverging according to 
changes in the funding structure (Appendix C - figure 2). In 2009, Popular 
incorporates Banco de Castilla, Banco de Credito Balear and Banco de Galicia, 
already members of Popular Group. Asset value liabilities register an increase 
in almost the same extent and all DD measures increase. The acquisition and 
merger of Banco Pastor, in June 2012, is responsible for another jump in the 
Popular’s asset value and liabilities and for the increase in all DD measures. In 
2H2013, the percentage of Popular’s assets funded with short term liabilities 
increased from an average of 40% since 2012, to an average of 49%, as a 
consequence, DD1 and DD2 register a fall. Simultaneously the weight of 
corporate bonds issued in Popular’s funding structure drops 0,6%, inducing an 
abrupt decrease in DD3. These movements were amplified by the increase in 
asset volatility registered since the beginning of 2012, from 0,5% to 0,78%. As 
in previous cases, the impact of ECBs funding policies are almost irrelevant, as 
DD2-DD1 reaches a peak of -27,30 std dev by the end of 2012. 
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In September 2011, before Banco de Valencia’s 1st bailout (capital 
injection of EUR 1 bn11), DD1 and DD2 reached their maximum at 117 and 88 
std dev, due to a fall in asset volatility from an average of 0,8% to 0,43% (until 
the 1st bailout) and a reduction of 4,5% in short term liabilities (Appendix C - 
figure 2).  
The fast decrease in asset value and the restructuration of assets prior to 
the 2nd bailout impacted the asset value volatility which jumped to an average of 
2,35% (January 2012 to February 2013) and to 18% after the 2nd capital 
injection. As consequence DD1 and DD2 register abrupt falls on the dates of 
the capital injections. DD3 started a downwards trend in the mid 2011, reaching 
negative levels in April 2012 (after the 1st bailout) and remaining negative until 
the second capital injection in March 2013. DD3 that does not have abrupt 
variations, revealed to be less sensitivity to changes in asset volatility.  
For Banco de Valencia ECB’s funding policy did not seem to be relevant 
until September 2011, when we observe a reduction in the banks’ risk of -29.79 
std dev. After the second capital injection and until the merger with Caixabank, 
ECB’s funding policies become irrelevant to Valencia’s risk.  
Bankia at the epicentre of Spanish banking system turmoil, had its Initial 
Public Offering in July 2011, therefore our calculations start at that moment. In 
May 2012 Bankia restates its 2011 annual in order to acknowledge a loss of 
EUR3 bn and a first amount EUR4,5 bn of preferred shares were converted into 
ordinary shares at the request of the board of Directors of BFA. Our DD 
                                                            
11 please resort to Appendix D for more detailed information 
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measures register an abrupt fall and for DD3 we obtain some negative 
readings. Later that year, in September, with the injection of EUR 4,5 bn by the 
FROB to restore the regulatory capital position of the group, DD3 shows signs 
of some relief and we obtain some positive readings, just to fall again. By the 
end of December 2012, with the recapitalization process (Capital increase of 
EUR 13,5 bn and the issuance of EUR 10,7 bn in CoCo Bonds) DD3 has an 
abrupt increase (Appendix C - figure 4). During this period DD2 becomes 
negative. Throughout 2013 it is perceivable a deleveraging process and the 
asset volatility jumps to an average of 2,41% (from an average of 1.96% in 
between May and December 2012). All our DD measures decrease and DD1 
reaches negative levels. From the Summer 2012 until June 2013, the ECB 
funding policy impacted Bankia’s risk with a reduction of 12,62 standard 
deviations on average.  
Overall, the impact of the ECB’s funding policies in our sample is 
irrelevant in 2006 and 2007, as DD2-DD1 for the sample averages -1.8 std dev 
(Appendix C – table 9). From 2008 to 2010, the funding structure of the banks in 
our sample revealed severe changes: i) Other Financial Institutions deposits 
weight on assets, fall to 15,4% from an average of 22,6%, ii) weight of Central 
Bank funding increased from 0.7% to 4,8%. During this period our DD2-DD1 is -
7,9 std dev (a reduction of 7,9 standard deviations in risk). In 2011-2012, the 
most acute moment for Iberian banks, DD2-DD1 averages -27,9 std dev. In 
2013, this measure is reduced to -17,8 std dev.  
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Chapter V – Conclusions 
 
In this study we stress how important is the definition of Default’s Barrier 
to the output of the structural model output. Through the use of three different 
Default’s Barrier definitions, we were able to obtain very different outputs (DD1, 
DD2 and DD3), showing different sensitivities to the funding structure of the 
banks. DD3, as it considers all bonds issued as long term, proved to be very 
sensitive to changes in the funding structure, in particular to reductions of the 
weight of bond issued. This effect is rather visible in the results obtained for 
BES. Regarding DD1 and DD2, these measures showed more sensitivity to 
changes in maturity of the liabilities, stressing the risk of mismatch between 
maturities. 
The timeline of our study comprises periods of highly leveraged balance 
sheets and the subsequent strong deleveraging. In general, our results are 
compatible with MKMV conclusions that the model biases default probabilities, 
overestimating the asset volatility for fast decreases in leverage the model and 
leading to higher default probability, even though credit risk is decreasing. The 
results obtained in 2013 for Santander, Popular, Bankia and BCP support this 
idea.  
Although, in general all outputs followed the same behaviour, only DD3 
was able to effectively signal distress in most cases. On the other hand, DD1 
and DD2 definitions, differing only on the way Central Bank loans were treated, 
were convenient to use the model through non-standard pathways. Throughout 
this crisis, liquidity risk was in some dimension offset by the ECB funding 
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policies. In our study we introduce and test a procedure anchored on Distance 
to Distress calculation, to quantify this reduction in risk induced by these 
actions. Our results show that ECB actions effectively reduced bank’s default 
risk, particularly during 2011-2012.  
When preparing the data for the computation of Distance to Default, we 
were surprise with the benign behaviour of clients’ deposits, fact that we related 
to the deposits assurance policy and its reinforcement during the peak of the 
crisis. A study and quantification of this effect is left for future research. 
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Appendix A – Deposits Behavior 
 
 
Appendix B – Harada, Ito & Takahashi (2010) DB Definition 
 
  
Bank Deposits  2006-2007  2008-2010  2011-2012 2013  2006-2007  2008-2010  2011-2012 2013
Central Bank 59.77% 39.8% 46.2% -8.8% 0.7% 4.8% 9.5% 8.9%
Other IF 3.2% -0.5% -4.5% -5.9% 22.6% 15.4% 10.4% 11.6%
Clients 4.2% 2.9% 0.5% 0.5% 43.3% 42.5% 42.4% 42.2%
Central Bank 27.62% 28.9% 298% -19% 1.23% 1.9% 4.0% 1.3%
Other IF -2.4% 2.3% 0% 1% 13.2% 10.5% 11% 11%
Clients 0.85% 0.85% 0% 2.03% 43.29% 36.74% 36% 41.84%
Central Bank -0.74% 25.9% 15% -13% 0.56% 2.4% 7.4% 7.8%
Other IF 0.2% 0.5% 3% 8% 16.0% 13.2% 8% 10%
Clients 1.07% 2.22% 0% -0.10% 54.57% 56.13% 59% 60.61%
Central Bank 156.08% 3.8% 7% -37% 0.30% 6.7% 15.4% 3.2%
Other IF 3.0% 2.2% -3% 2% 13.9% 12.2% 14% 33%
Clients 1.46% 0.36% -1% -2.26% 68.30% 61.60% 60% 47.37%
Central Bank 6% -2% 8.4% 17.4%
Other IF 2% 1% 8% 10%
Clients -1% -0.43% 51% 42.91%
Central Bank 226% 102% 3% -4% 1% 6% 14% 14%
Other IF 4.41% -13.82% -14.60% -4.38% 41% 21% 9% 7%
Clients 2.18% 1.4% 1.08% 3.2% 36% 33% 35% 44%
Central Bank -25% 9% 20% -2% 0% 4% 7% 10%
Other IF 5.67% 8.38% -7.72% -20.31% 20% 17% 14% 10%
Clients 11.26% 0.8% 1.64% 2.6% 41% 43% 40% 44%
Central Bank 34% 38% 7% -5% 2% 4% 5% 0%
Other IF 3.38% 12.37% -14.62% -10.67% 13% 14% 13% 8%
Clients 4.18% 2.3% 3.46% 5.4% 15% 10% 10% 13%
Central Bank 0% 71% 13% 10% 0% 8% 16% 18%
Other IF 8.36% -15.43% -1.46% -23.78% 41% 20% 6% 4%
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Appendix C – DD Results 
Figure 1  
 
 
1 Weight of bonds issues drop in Santander’s funding structure from 10% in December 2006 to 9% in July 2007.DD3   
2 reduction of 22% in other financial intuitions loans in conjunction with a drop of 6% in clients’ deposits, affect funding structure, with 
corporate bond regaining importance (15%). DD1 and 2 fall, while DD3 increases. 
3 Merger of Banesto, member of Santander Group since 1994, with Santander 
 
Figure 2 
1 Merger of Banco de Castilla,Banco de Credito Balear and Banco de Galicia, members of Popular Group, with Banco Popular.  
2 Acquisition and Merger of Banco Pastor with Banco Popular. 
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Figure 3 
1 1st Baillout of Banco Valencia: Capital injection: € 1 bn, credit line: € 2 bn  
2 Equity reduction by absorption of losses, and transmission of toxic assets to SAREB 
3 2nd Baillout of Banco Valencia: FROB’s assistance for recapitalising the bank, in the form of shares valued in  € 4.5 bn 
4 Banco Valencia is sold to CaixaBank 
 
Figure 4 
1 BANKIA Initial Public Offering  
2 The first EUR4,5 bn of preference shares were converted into ordinary shares at the request of the board of Directors of BFA in May 
2012. 
3 Injection of EUR4,5b n by the FROB in September2012 to restore the regulatory capital position of the group 




























04/01/2006 04/01/2007 04/01/2008 04/01/2009 04/01/2010 04/01/2011 04/01/2012 04/01/2013
Banco de Valencia
















































































































































































































Daniela Azeredo           Structural Models to Estimate Financial Institution’s Default Probability 45 
 
 45     
Figure 5 
 
1 Capital increase of EUR 1,3 bn in April 2008 
2 Growth in debt portfolio to EUR 6,7 bn (vs EUR 2,02 bn in 2009); 43% of this growth was due to Portuguese Soverign Debt. 
3 Capital increases in 2011 of EUR 260 mn  
4 Capital increase of EUR 500 mn in October 2012 
5 ECB loans weight on BCP’s assets grow from an average of 2% until mid 2009, to a maximum of 16% in 2010, with the respective 
reduction of db1. DD2-DD1 reflects that movement  
6 ECB loans are converted to long term, db2 converges to db1 (the difference between the two is ½ of ECB’s loans) and DD2-DD1 
becomes closer to zero. 
 
Figure 6 
1 Capital increase of EUR 1,19 bn in May 2009 
2 Capital increase of EUR 500 mn in December 2011 
3 Capital increase of EUR 1 bn in May 2012 
4 ECB’s long term refinancing operations (3 years), that led to a conversion in the maturities of ECBs’ loans to BES  
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Figure 7 
1 Capital increase 2008 of EUR 350 mn.Growth of the credit portfolio in EUR 1,7bn, funded gy an increase of €3bn in clients’ 
deposits 
2 Acquisition of EUR4,7 bn in sovereign debt (+633% when comparing to 2008); 57,8% of the portfolio is Portuguese Sovereign debt 
3 ECB’s non standard refinancing operations:CBPP and CBPP2; Securities Markets Programme 
4 ECB’s long term refinancing operations (3 years): ECB’s long term loans represent aprox. 80% of total loans.  
5 Capital increase 2012 of EUR 200 mn. 
6 Reduction of credit portfolio in EUR 2,3 bn.  
7 % Bonds issued on Total assets reaches 6% (increase in db3) and conversion of clients’ deposits from shorter to longer terms 
(clients deposits maturing in 1 to 5 years grew 125% from EUR 1,8 bn to EUR 4 bn- decrease in db2 and 1)  
 
Figure 8  
1 Acknowledge of EUR 2,753 bn of debt acquired under securitization programmes in 2010, and an extra EUR 0,5 bn in 2011  
2 Acknowledge of impairments of EUR 711 mn. 
3 ECB’s long term refinancing operations (3 years), Banif’s convert’s aproximately 50% of ECBs’ loans in long term liabilities 
4 Capital increase in 2013 of EUR 450 mn 
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DD1 DD3 DD1 DD2
DD2-
DD1 DD3 DD1 DD2
DD2-
DD1 DD3 DD1 DD2
DD2-
DD1 DD3 DD1 DD2
DD2-
DD1 DD3 DD1 DD2
DD2-
DD1 DD3 DD1 DD2
DD2-
DD1 DD3 DD1 DD2
DD2-
DD1 DD3 DD1 DD2
DD2-
DD1
2006 up to 12/09/2007 Time Range Average 78,4 83,7 81,9 -1,8 60,6 65,9 64,6 -1,3 78,7 93,8 92,1 -1,7 43,3 55,7 55,6 -0,1 45,0 67,7 67,0 -0,7 68,7 77,7 77,6 -0,1 228,5 197,5 188,8 -8,7 23,9 27,5 27,5 0,0
19/09/2007 Northern Rock bank Run 71,9 74,6 73,4 -1,2 51,3 61,3 60,6 -0,6 74,8 70,8 70,8 0,0 42,0 47,8 47,8 0,0 44,8 57,3 56,3 -1,0 80,2 92,6 92,6 0,0 190,0 163,8 156,7 -7,1 20,2 28,6 28,6 0,0
Time Range Average 66,0 69,7 67,8 -1,9 55,0 69,7 65,6 -4,1 73,6 69,1 69,0 -0,1 40,0 47,4 46,8 -0,5 37,1 47,8 46,8 -1,0 67,6 78,3 78,3 0,0 169,3 145,4 137,8 -7,6 19,5 30,5 30,5 0,0
20/02/2008 Northern Rock is nacionalized 55,7 59,6 57,6 -2,0 47,3 56,1 54,9 -1,2 57,6 54,1 53,4 -0,7 34,4 43,7 41,9 -1,8 30,0 39,9 38,6 -1,3 57,6 67,0 67,0 0,0 146,0 124,3 115,3 -9,1 16,9 32,0 32,0 0,0
Time Range Average 55,3 59,8 57,6 -2,2 51,0 65,6 63,7 -1,9 51,6 48,6 48,0 -0,6 34,7 44,3 42,3 -2,0 30,1 39,5 38,2 -1,3 52,6 60,8 60,8 0,0 150,6 128,1 118,6 -9,5 16,5 31,9 31,9 0,0
26/03/2008 JP Morgan acquires Bear Stearns 53,6 58,4 56,2 -2,2 51,0 66,6 64,6 -2,0 47,2 44,6 44,1 -0,5 35,7 45,8 43,6 -2,2 29,0 37,7 36,5 -1,2 49,5 57,4 57,4 0,0 148,5 126,0 116,6 -9,4 14,4 30,6 30,6 0,0
Time Range Average 49,0 54,3 52,0 -2,3 49,1 60,9 59,3 -1,6 45,2 48,3 45,7 -2,6 33,4 43,9 41,5 -2,4 25,6 34,3 33,1 -1,2 46,3 53,6 53,6 0,0 131,9 111,7 103,2 -8,5 11,7 27,6 27,6 0,0
02/07/2008 BCP - CMVM files a criminal complaint against BCP 48,6 56,0 52,3 -3,6 45,5 56,2 55,9 -0,4 48,0 53,1 48,1 -5,0 31,6 44,3 41,4 -3,0 24,7 39,9 37,0 -2,9 31,6 38,1 38,1 0,0 144,6 123,2 109,0 -14,2 14,1 36,8 36,8 0,0
09/07/2008 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac placed in government conservatorship 49,5 56,7 53,0 -3,7 45,0 55,5 55,1 -0,4 48,5 53,6 48,6 -5,0 32,3 45,0 42,1 -3,0 26,5 42,1 39,1 -3,0 32,1 38,5 38,5 0,0 146,7 124,9 110,4 -14,5 15,3 37,5 37,5 0,0
23/07/2008 HBOS acquired by Lloyds at 18th Sep 42,7 49,8 46,8 -3,1 43,3 53,1 52,8 -0,3 43,8 48,5 43,9 -4,5 31,0 43,1 40,3 -2,8 26,0 41,5 38,5 -3,0 27,2 32,3 32,3 0,0 113,7 97,3 86,5 -10,9 14,2 32,9 32,9 0,0
Time Range Average 44,6 52,6 49,2 -3,4 44,1 57,7 57,3 -0,4 45,0 48,3 43,5 -4,7 29,2 42,8 39,3 -3,6 28,3 44,7 41,5 -3,2 27,4 32,7 32,7 0,0 121,6 103,9 92,2 -11,7 17,0 37,8 37,8 0,0
10/09/2008 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac placed in government conservatorship 45,9 53,4 50,0 -3,4 46,1 60,6 60,2 -0,4 45,4 46,1 41,8 -4,2 28,7 41,5 37,8 -3,7 30,3 46,4 43,3 -3,1 27,2 32,4 32,4 0,0 124,2 106,1 94,1 -12,0 19,2 40,5 40,5 0,0
Lehman Brothers files for Chapter11 bankruptcy protection & 46,6 54,3 50,9 -3,4 45,0 60,4 59,9 -0,5 45,4 46,0 41,8 -4,1 27,4 39,0 35,7 -3,3 31,3 47,8 44,6 -3,2 28,2 33,8 33,8 0,0 127,5 108,7 96,3 -12,4 21,4 44,4 44,4 0,0
Bank of America announces its intent to acquire Merrill Lynch
FED  authorizes a loan up to $85 billion to AIG.  
24/09/2008 HBOS acquired by Lloyds at 18th Sep 44,2 51,6 48,6 -3,0 41,1 54,8 54,4 -0,4 40,7 41,2 37,8 -3,4 26,7 36,3 33,5 -2,7 32,6 48,9 45,8 -3,2 29,1 34,4 34,4 0,0 117,3 100,3 89,0 -11,3 21,6 45,1 45,1 0,0
Dexia and Fortis Bank nationalised. 41,5 49,7 46,5 -3,2 37,0 50,5 48,4 -2,1 33,5 36,5 32,9 -3,6 27,4 37,7 34,8 -2,9 31,8 48,9 45,6 -3,3 28,3 33,7 33,7 0,0 109,0 93,4 83,1 -10,3 23,2 47,1 47,1 0,0
Bradford & Bingley nationalised and partly sold to Santander Group
08/10/2008 Icelandic Crisis, LandsBanki, Glitnir and Kauphting Bank Nationalised 42,1 50,9 47,6 -3,3 35,9 48,9 46,8 -2,1 34,2 37,3 33,6 -3,7 27,4 37,9 34,9 -3,0 33,7 52,3 48,7 -3,6 29,9 35,7 35,7 0,0 111,5 95,4 84,8 -10,7 21,9 48,5 48,5 0,0
15/10/2008 RBS nationalised, Lloyds taken in 43.5% by the govenment, 40,1 48,7 45,5 -3,2 32,1 44,4 42,4 -1,9 32,9 35,9 32,3 -3,6 26,6 37,6 34,4 -3,1 31,9 48,6 45,4 -3,2 29,1 34,7 34,7 0,0 107,3 92,0 81,7 -10,2 20,8 47,6 47,6 0,0
22/10/2008 UBS bailout plan (17/10) 40,7 49,5 46,3 -3,2 32,0 45,0 42,9 -2,1 33,5 36,6 32,9 -3,7 27,2 38,3 35,1 -3,2 32,9 50,6 47,2 -3,4 29,4 35,1 35,1 0,0 108,2 92,6 82,3 -10,3 21,8 48,5 48,5 0,0
Time Range Average 40,5 49,2 45,9 -3,2 28,0 38,0 35,9 -2,1 31,1 35,9 32,5 -3,4 22,7 32,5 29,7 -2,8 35,1 54,6 50,8 -3,8 31,8 37,6 37,6 0,0 111,2 95,3 84,8 -10,5 24,0 50,2 50,2 0,0
26/11/2008 Citigroup bailout plan 43,6 52,3 48,9 -3,5 27,8 36,8 34,7 -2,1 30,2 35,8 32,3 -3,4 22,2 31,3 28,7 -2,6 38,2 59,2 55,1 -4,1 34,5 40,9 40,9 0,0 124,7 106,6 94,6 -12,0 27,8 55,8 55,8 0,0
Time Range Average 41,8 51,9 47,7 -4,2 25,2 32,6 30,9 -1,7 32,9 41,2 37,4 -3,9 24,4 34,0 30,3 -3,7 37,4 61,3 55,9 -5,5 39,4 45,4 45,4 0,0 105,9 95,1 82,5 -12,6 27,7 53,8 51,5 -2,3
21/01/2009 Anglo Irish Bank nationalized on the 15/01 45,8 58,9 53,4 -5,5 27,1 34,6 33,9 -0,7 40,8 53,6 49,1 -4,5 27,1 37,9 33,8 -4,1 45,5 79,4 70,6 -8,8 52,3 58,6 58,6 0,0 95,5 92,8 77,7 -15,1 32,2 55,3 50,0 -5,2
Time Range Average 48,1 61,6 56,1 -5,5 24,6 33,1 32,4 -0,7 46,8 55,9 54,2 -1,7 25,4 37,5 32,4 -5,0 50,9 88,5 78,7 -9,7 57,8 64,6 64,6 0,0 98,9 96,1 80,4 -15,7 32,0 55,5 50,2 -5,3
01/04/2009 Caja de Ahorros Castilla La Mancha rescue plan 46,3 60,3 54,9 -5,3 19,6 28,5 27,7 -0,7 46,9 54,5 53,2 -1,3 24,1 35,2 30,5 -4,6 52,4 93,6 82,9 -10,7 56,6 63,2 63,2 0,0 91,2 88,7 74,3 -14,4 33,3 58,2 52,5 -5,6
Time Range Average 49,2 63,4 56,8 -6,6 19,6 28,7 26,6 -2,1 54,3 62,1 58,8 -3,3 24,4 38,9 34,5 -4,4 54,0 88,4 82,1 -6,2 69,4 80,7 71,2 -9,5 74,2 69,9 61,2 -8,8 48,2 74,9 63,3 -11,6
05/05/2010 ECB - SMP Beginnig 58,9 84,3 70,9 -13,5 30,3 50,6 45,9 -4,7 69,2 78,8 71,9 -7,0 30,8 60,3 51,6 -8,7 57,1 92,8 82,2 -10,6 98,7 119,0 95,9 -23,1 66,1 74,2 61,7 -12,6 59,7 114,5 86,8 -27,7
26/05/2010 Cajasur rescue plan 53,1 77,1 64,4 -12,6 24,5 41,3 37,4 -3,9 59,4 67,8 61,7 -6,1 26,4 52,0 44,5 -7,6 53,0 86,1 76,3 -9,8 79,3 95,5 77,0 -18,5 66,6 74,9 62,1 -12,9 62,8 121,7 91,9 -29,8
Time Range Average 54,2 78,3 65,1 -13,2 25,0 36,7 34,0 -2,8 57,5 72,6 61,5 -11,2 27,4 52,6 45,3 -7,3 54,8 88,5 78,5 -10,0 85,3 102,7 82,9 -19,8 65,9 73,8 61,5 -12,3 63,4 121,2 92,0 -29,2
30/06/2010 ECB - End of CBPP 48,9 82,6 60,6 -22,0 21,4 32,1 29,5 -2,6 53,5 65,6 58,4 -7,2 23,4 49,4 41,3 -8,1 47,4 120,7 79,8 -40,9 97,0 122,4 95,4 -27,0 52,0 74,4 45,6 -28,9 47,7 113,5 74,2 -39,4
Time Range Average 47,3 79,9 58,5 -21,4 21,1 30,9 28,5 -2,4 49,6 60,6 54,1 -6,4 22,4 44,4 37,5 -6,9 46,3 118,1 78,0 -40,0 93,7 118,2 92,1 -26,1 49,4 70,9 43,3 -27,6 48,6 116,2 75,7 -40,4
28/07/2010 23/07- Four Spanish Cajas (Saving Banks) suspend the EU stress tests 45,0 75,8 55,6 -20,1 20,3 29,7 27,4 -2,3 46,7 56,8 50,9 -5,9 22,0 42,5 36,1 -6,4 43,4 108,9 72,3 -36,6 88,5 111,3 87,0 -24,3 45,5 64,8 39,9 -24,9 48,5 116,4 75,8 -40,6
Time Range Average 45,6 83,1 61,2 -21,9 21,6 34,8 33,9 -1,0 50,0 64,6 59,8 -4,8 24,2 63,2 52,1 -11,1 38,6 57,8 53,5 -4,3 66,1 151,8 90,6 -61,2 82,9 102,6 85,0 -17,7 42,0 80,1 50,5 -29,6 38,9 109,9 64,2 -45,7
23/11/2011 21/11- Spanish government bails out Banco de Valencia 50,6 112,1 75,9 -36,1 24,5 44,1 41,2 -3,0 64,4 92,2 78,2 -14,0 17,5 90,9 68,9 -22,0 46,0 74,1 67,7 -6,4 85,3 220,0 118,1 -101,9 94,8 119,4 101,6 -17,8 31,0 97,5 52,2 -45,3 41,6 158,2 79,5 -78,7
Time Range Average 45,1 93,8 64,2 -29,5 27,4 45,3 42,3 -3,0 49,0 69,7 58,7 -11,0 12,8 49,5 38,4 -11,2 38,7 59,8 54,4 -5,4 86,3 223,3 121,6 -101,7 82,6 102,6 87,6 -15,0 28,5 77,8 45,0 -32,8 35,2 122,2 65,8 -56,3
25/01/2012 ECB Long Term REF OPE 3Y maturity 39,7 76,7 54,6 -22,1 30,1 47,9 44,1 -3,8 37,5 54,0 44,2 -9,7 8,8 17,2 14,2 -3,1 38,7 62,4 55,4 -7,1 70,3 185,9 103,6 -82,4 72,3 88,7 75,3 -13,3 25,4 52,5 35,9 -16,6 34,3 104,9 63,8 -41,1
22/02/2012 ECB Long Term REF OPE 3Y maturity 35,1 67,2 48,5 -18,7 32,4 49,8 46,2 -3,6 37,1 54,2 43,9 -10,3 7,2 18,2 14,2 -4,1 33,2 57,3 49,8 -7,5 55,9 145,2 81,6 -63,7 62,5 76,2 65,1 -11,2 21,8 42,6 29,9 -12,8 30,8 93,8 57,1 -36,8
29/02/2012 ECB - SMP End 35,1 67,9 49,1 -18,8 33,7 52,5 48,7 -3,8 38,8 55,5 45,4 -10,2 2,9 19,7 14,2 -5,5 33,8 58,3 50,7 -7,7 54,7 140,9 79,5 -61,5 64,3 78,5 66,9 -11,6 21,7 42,6 29,8 -12,8 31,2 95,0 57,8 -37,2
Time Range Average 39,2 78,5 55,5 -23,0 35,1 56,7 51,5 -5,1 43,1 61,0 49,9 -11,0 1,3 20,8 13,6 -7,2 33,0 58,6 50,6 -8,0 67,7 176,6 99,0 -77,6 73,4 89,7 76,4 -13,3 23,7 49,4 33,7 -15,7 36,2 115,2 69,1 -46,1
09/05/2012 Spanish Gov. Nationalizes  BFA owner of Bankia 41,6 87,9 60,3 -27,5 37,3 60,5 54,1 -6,3 44,0 64,3 51,6 -12,7 -0,7 19,5 11,5 -8,0 26,1 53,5 44,9 -8,5 80,3 211,4 117,9 -93,4 79,0 96,8 82,3 -14,5 24,7 53,4 35,8 -17,6 42,0 143,7 84,4 -59,3
Time Range Average 42,2 93,9 63,1 -30,9 36,5 59,9 53,5 -6,4 44,7 66,7 52,9 -13,8 -1,2 21,3 12,4 -8,9 11,3 35,4 27,9 -7,5 83,5 217,9 122,1 -95,8 87,7 107,7 91,4 -16,2 26,4 59,3 39,2 -20,1 49,1 183,1 105,0 -78,1
BPI aproves issuance of Eur1,5 bn of Coco's Bond, 41,9 95,2 62,9 -32,2 37,6 57,9 52,4 -5,5 45,2 68,3 54,0 -14,3 -0,2 23,2 13,9 -9,3 3,6 27,3 19,9 -7,4 100,8 263,4 147,6 -115,8 75,1 91,5 78,2 -13,3 25,2 55,0 36,8 -18,3 47,8 174,6 100,7 -73,9
BCP annouces the issuance of EUR3,5 bn of CoCo's
13/06/2012 Spain's financial assistance Package 42,4 95,4 63,5 -31,9 37,6 57,5 52,1 -5,4 45,2 68,6 54,1 -14,5 0,3 22,1 13,5 -8,7 3,0 27,3 19,8 -7,6 94,6 244,3 137,6 -106,7 77,0 93,7 80,1 -13,6 25,9 57,1 38,0 -19,1 55,6 192,2 112,6 -79,6
Time Range Average 36,2 94,1 59,3 -34,8 35,5 56,5 49,6 -7,0 59,7 86,3 69,7 -16,6 -1,2 24,1 14,0 -10,1 -1,9 24,2 16,1 -8,1 113,7 254,9 143,9 -111,0 64,5 89,3 74,8 -14,5 22,7 62,4 37,1 -25,3 -3,3 155,2 69,2 -85,9
01/08/2012 ECB -OMTs 33,8 97,3 58,0 -39,3 32,0 51,1 44,0 -7,1 62,5 95,7 71,9 -23,8 -5,4 20,2 10,7 -9,5 0,6 21,5 15,0 -6,5 137,5 292,0 165,0 -127,0 65,3 96,9 80,2 -16,7 21,9 70,3 39,0 -31,3 -44,5 130,8 38,2 -92,7
Time Range Average 31,1 81,3 49,6 -31,7 30,3 48,2 41,6 -6,6 59,1 88,0 68,0 -20,0 -0,8 11,4 6,8 -4,7 5,0 19,2 13,1 -6,1 116,4 245,1 139,3 -105,8 52,1 75,7 63,2 -12,5 20,5 60,6 34,7 -25,9 -34,0 102,4 30,3 -72,1
31/10/2012 ECB - End of CBPP2 25,2 71,5 43,3 -28,2 29,5 45,4 40,3 -5,1 65,0 104,4 76,9 -27,4 -5,8 8,0 2,0 -6,0 2,6 20,7 10,2 -10,6 75,9 152,6 89,6 -63,0 50,1 71,1 60,0 -11,1 20,9 55,1 33,0 -22,1 -37,1 114,8 34,5 -80,3
Time Range Average 24,9 73,9 44,5 -29,4 30,8 47,1 41,9 -5,2 63,7 100,8 76,5 -24,4 -8,6 9,1 1,4 -7,6 -1,3 20,5 7,8 -12,8 78,7 157,6 92,8 -64,9 54,3 77,2 65,1 -12,1 21,9 55,6 33,8 -21,8 -40,5 123,3 36,7 -86,6
02/01/2013 BANIF- portuguese government anounces Recap. Program 16,4 60,2 36,8 -23,4 27,1 43,1 38,5 -4,6 44,6 64,7 50,0 -14,7 -10,9 22,2 -2,3 -24,5 -12,9 17,5 -0,9 -18,3 61,1 105,3 77,8 -27,5 38,8 70,9 57,9 -13,0 16,1 44,9 33,0 -11,9 -33,0 113,5 40,8 -72,7
Time Range Average 15,7 52,7 35,6 -17,1 34,3 48,0 46,7 -1,3 30,6 45,8 36,1 -9,6 -0,5 5,1 2,0 -3,1 -16,8 2,7 -8,8 -11,5 49,5 100,4 76,7 -23,6 18,9 57,3 45,0 -12,3 13,5 46,0 31,2 -14,8 -4,0 116,4 55,6 -60,8
Average 2006-2007 77,0 82,0 80,3 -1,8 60,0 66,5 64,9 -1,6 78,4 90,6 89,1 -1,5 43,2 54,7 54,6 -0,1 44,2 65,3 64,6 -0,7 69,0 78,4 78,3 -0,1 220,9 190,8 182,5 -8,4 23,4 27,8 27,8 0,0
Average 2008-2010 48,3 63,2 55,3 -7,9 28,6 39,0 37,2 -1,9 48,7 55,3 51,8 -3,5 26,4 41,1 36,8 -4,3 43,9 78,0 66,7 -11,3 63,9 76,1 67,0 -9,0 90,2 86,0 72,8 -13,2 36,3 67,1 55,2 -11,9
Average 2011-2012 39,9 85,0 58,2 -26,7 27,3 44,6 41,3 -3,3 53,3 74,9 63,6 -11,3 11,7 44,6 34,3 -10,3 21,6 42,8 35,7 -7,0 83,7 190,4 108,4 -82,0 71,5 90,5 77,1 -13,4 30,7 71,2 44,7 -26,5 19,7 121,1 60,8 -60,2
Average 2013 15,7 52,9 35,6 -17,3 34,2 47,9 46,5 -1,4 30,9 46,1 36,4 -9,7 -0,9 5,7 1,8 -3,9 -16,7 3,0 -8,6 -11,7 49,7 100,5 76,8 -23,7 19,3 57,6 45,3 -12,3 13,5 46,0 31,2 -14,8 -4,6 116,3 55,3 -61,0
BES BANIF
17/09/2008
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Appendix D – Additional Information on the sample 
• Millenium BCP; founded in 1985, BCP is the largest Portuguese 
private bank, in terms of asset value. In 2012, as a result of EBA’s valuation and 
the need to fulfil the capital requirements, BCP issued EUR 3 bn of contingent 
convertible subordinated bonds (CoCo), hybrid instruments qualifyable as tier 1 
capital. CoCo Bonds were fully subscribed by the government with resource to 
PAEF bank’s recapitalization fund. Additionally, BCP performed a capital 
increase of EUR 500 mn reserved to shareholders. As of May 2014 BCP had 
already paid back EUR 400 mn to Portuguese Government, and in July the 
bank made a capital increase of EUR 2,25 bn, of which EUR 1,85 bn are 
targeted to repay the public funds used to recapitalize the bank. 
 
• BES; founded in 1920, was the second largest private financial 
institution in Portugal. In 2012, BES was the only of the four Portuguese listed 
banks to perform the recapitalization process without state’s assistance, 
achieving a Core Tier 1 Ratio of 10,5%. The balance sheet deleveraging 
programme reduced transformation ratio from 198% in 2010 to 137% in 2012.  
In 2013 Banco de Portugal (BoP) performed an audit inspection that went 
beyond the normal scope, requesting information regarding the main non-
financial customers of the bank (ETRICC2 - Horizontal Review of Credit 
Portfolio Impairment) and found evidences that Espírito Santo Group might had 
developed a potentially fraudulent funding scheme between the companies 
belonging to the group[6].  
BoP promoted a ring-fencing policy around BES, in order to protect it 
against further exposure to the group. However, even with this policy, BES’ 
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direct exposure to the ES Group grew in the 1H2014 from EUR 701,2 mn to 
EUR 1,572 bn, and clients’ exposure grew from EUR 2,5 bn to EUR 3,1 bn12.  
In June 2014, the bank raised EUR 1,045 bn in capital, but warned 
investors regarding the bank’s exposure to the family economic group. By the 
end of July, in its 1H report, BES wrote down EUR 4,254 bn of impairments and 
contingent costs, leading to a loss of Eur3,577 bn. Core Tier 1 Ratio lowered to 
5,0% as of 30th June, bellow the minimum of 7% required by BoP. On 1st of 
August, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank decided to 
suspend BES access to monetary policy operations. Sunday, the 3rd of August 
2014, BoP governor announced the split of BES into two institutions: 
i) BES (“bad bank”), saw its banking licence revoked and kept the 
problematic assets, with BES’ shareholders and subordinated creditors fully 
responsible for the losses registered from these assets; 
ii) Novo Banco received the remaining assets and liabilities of BES, and 
was fully capitalized in EUR 4,9 bn by the newly formed Resolution Fund. Due 
to its low funding ability, Resolution Fund had to resort to a temporary loan from 
the FAP funds to obtain EUR 3,9 bn.  
• BPI, created in 1984, is the third largest private bank in Portugal, 
in terms of assets. As an output of EBA assessment and to attain a Core Tier I 
Ratio of 9% with effect from June 2012, BPI was required to a temporary capital 
reinforcement of EUR 1,39 bn. This capital need was greatly due to the 
exposure to sovereign debt. BPI’s recapitalisation occurred through the 
                                                            
12 BES 1H14 Report and Accounts 
Daniela Azeredo           Structural Models to Estimate Financial Institution’s Default Probability 50 
 
 50     
issuance of EUR1,5 bn in CoCo bonds with a five-year maturity, fully subscribed 
by the Portuguese Government in June 2012. During the 1H2014, BPI repaid 
EUR 920 mn, the remaining amount of CoCo bonds. BPI was the first 
Portuguese bank to fully repay the loan. In June 2014, the Core Tier 1 Ratio 
was 14.1%. 
• Banif; EBA’s 2011 evaluation detected capital needs of  
EUR 1,1 bn. In the beginning of 2013 BANIF started a recapitalization program 
of EUR 1,4 bn, being the remaining EUR 300 mn a safeguard to cope with 
future risks. The state assured the subscription EUR 700 mn in special shares 
and EUR 400mn in CoCo bonds to be repaid throughout 2013 and 2014. By the 
end of 2013, Portuguese Government owned 68,77% equity in Banif. In the 
summer of 2013, and in the context of the recapitalization program, Banif made 
a capital increase of EUR 450 mn reserved to private investors. In the end of 
2013, the Core Tier 1 Ratio was 13,6%. 
• Banco Santander; classified as a systematically important 
financial institution (to big to fail), was in 2013 the largest Spanish bank in terms 
of assets and 18th globally. It is the only bank in our sample that did not need to 
reinforce the Core Tier 1 capital.  
• Banco Popular, is the sixth-largest Spanish bank in terms of 
assets, with a total of EUR 153 bn, and mostly focused on the retail banking 
business. Due to the output of EBAs stress tests, Banco Popular’s Board was 
required to undertake measures to clean-up the bank’s balance sheet, by 
creating provisions of EUR 9,3 bn euros and an internal “bad bank” to manage 
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the problematic assets. EBA also identified the need of a capital reinforcement 
of EUR 2,5 bn. Popular was the only bank in our sample that did not require 
state assistance to perform the recapitalization required by EBA. The Core Tier 
1 Ratio was 11.99% in 2013.  
• Banco de Valencia was the first commercial bank to receive state 
help. In 2011 had approximately 65% of its credit granted to the housing sector 
(construction and real estate), for an average of 50.7% in the Spanish banking 
system. In November of 2011, Bank of Spain was forced to rescue it with  
EUR 1 bn and placed the bank under its official administration. In July 2012, 
FROB announced that found evidence of malpractices and would file criminal 
complaints of fraud and other irregularities against the former management. In 
November 2012, as part of the scope of Spanish banks’ recapitalization 
process, FROB announced the injection of another EUR 4,5 bn , through a 
capital increase and the transmission of the problematic assets to SAREB. 
Later on, FROB’s position in Banco de Valencia capital was sold to CaixaBank 
at the symbolic price of 1€. The merger of the two banks was effective on July 
19th 2013. 
• Bankia: all relevant information about Bankia is in Chapter I  
